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NOTES

victed murderer, who was still living, was barred from inheriting through
him. The murderer was convicted of the felonious killing of his mother.
The son of the murderer, i.e., the grandson of the deceased, brought an
action claiming the estate of the deceased, basing his contention on the
fact that his father was precluded by statute from inheriting, and that he
was the rightful heir. The Court said, "Other lineal descendants are so
appointed only in case there is no child of the intestate living at the time
of her death. Despite the serious charge against him, decedent's son was
living at the time of decendent's death, hence other lineal descendants are
not appointed by law to succeed to her real estate." 23 The Court ruled
that the grandson was disqualified from inheriting, and permitted the
sister of the deceased to take instead.
Those statutes with a provision for the conviction of a murderer are
not without pitfalls. 24 For example, a Kansas case 25 held that a verdict
by the coroner's jury that the deceased had been killed by her husband,
was not a conviction within the contemplation of the Kansas statute. Since
the killer had committed suicide before the trial, there could be no conviction. Consequently, the wife's property was inherited by the husband, and,
at his death, went to his heirs.
The interpretation of the statutes by our three sister states would
indicate a negative answer to our topic question, i.e., does the Wyoming
statute require a conviction. None of the states in making their rulings
in the probate court, have held themselves bound by the fact that there
was a conviction of the murderer, and all seem to follow the construction
that without express legislation on how to proceed in the matter, they will
decide the cases on the merits.
LEONARD E. LANG

TRANSFER OF POSSESSION AS A TAXABLE SALE

A large number of states have enacted legislation assessing a tax upon
retail sales. Most, if not all, of the laws governing such tax have incorporated in them a definition of the term sale. This article is concerned with
those laws that define the term sale, as does Wyoming's,' as including a
"transfer of possession of tangible personal property for a consideration."
The courts have recognized that this is an extremely broad definition of
the term and have by court decision, qualified it to a greater or lesser
degree. The purpose of this paper is to point out some of the more common
"tests" the courts have applied in determining if a transfer of possession is
such as to constitute a taxable retail sale.
23. Id. at 380, 162 P.2d 379.
24. Wade, supra note 3, at 723,
25. Hogg v. Whitham, 120 Kan. 341, 242 Pac. 1021 (1926).

1. Wyo. Comp Stat. 1945, Sec, 32-2502.
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In determining if a transfer of possession is a taxable sale the courts
have often considered if the transfer arrangement is one that takes the
place of a sale; i.e. even though the transaction is accompanied by legal
mechanics other than a sale, such as a lease, it in effect accomplishes the
same purpose. A California Intermediate Court 2 placed great emphasis
upon the term "in lieu of sales" in determining if a transfer of possession
was a taxable sale. The statute of CaliforniaA under which this case was
decided, qualified its definition of sale so as to include only transactions
that were "in lieu of transfer of title". This case involved a transfer of
drilling equipment (bits) to a drilling contractor under a lease arrangement; the manufacturor of the drilling equipment being the "lessor". Even
though there was no tranfer of title involved and the "lessee" was ultimately
to return the bits to the "lessor", the court held the transaction was taxable
as a sale, inasmuch as the equipment was "substantially consumed" under
one lease agreement. There is an indication that the courts would so hold
even in the absence of such a qualifying statement in the statute. An Iowa
case 4 involved a transfer of possession of personal property in which the
transferor entered into a written contract, with the parties specifically
stating the contract was one for services. The court in holding the transaction constituted a taxable sale said: "The fact that he (transferor) does
enter into a written contract does not of itself make the transaction a conract for service rather than for ...sale of personal property. He (transferor) can call this what he pleases. The question is what is it under the
statute." 5 The Code of Iowa, 6 under which the case was decided, defines
sale as "any transfer, exchange or barter . . .in any means ...for a consideration." An Arkansas decision, 7 while not specifically referring to the
phrase "in lieu of transfer of title," applied a test which in effect amounted
to the same thing. The court said, in holding a transfer of possession was
not a taxable sale, "The transfer of possession ... mearis a transfer that in
effect amounts to a sale. The legislature intended to tax sales under whatIn refusing to accept, without
ever disguises they might masquerade."
qualification, the statutory definition of sale 9 as a mere transfer of possession, the court said: "Wherever it can be said there is a sale on a lease or
rental basis, it must have some of the charcteristics of a sale, and not be a
lease or a rental in fact." 10 A study of the cases in point show a trend of
the courts to look beyond the technical legal arrangements in determining
if a transfer of possession, with no transfer of title, constitutes a taxable
sale. In looking beyond the legal arrangements the courts will consider if
2. Universal Eng. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 256 P.2d 1059 (1953).
3. Deerings Calif. Codes, Revenue and Taxation, Sec. 6006, (a) (1943).
4. Kistner v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, 225 Iowa 404, 280 N.W. 587
(1938).
5. Ibid.
6. Code of Iowa, 1935, Sec. 6943-f38(b).
7. U-Drive-Em Service Co. v. State by Hardin, Commissioner of Revenues, 205 Ark. 501,
169 S.W.2d 584 (1943).
8. Ibid.
9. The Arkansas Gross Receipts Act, 1941, Sec. 1,Act 386.
10. Supra note 7.
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the transaction is in lieu of transfer of title or a sale in disguise. The effect
of such reasoning is to defeat, in some instances at least, attempts to escape
sales tax liability on transactions that are as a rule considered as sales. Such
decisions also tend to "soften" the harshness of a literal interpretation of
very broad definitions in statutes governing tax on retail sales.
Another test the courts have applied in determining the tax aspects of
a transaction could be referred to as the "time test"; i.e. for what length
of time does the transferee of an article have it in his possession? A recent
Colorado case" involved a transfer of automobiles to customers by a concern engaged in the driverless car business. In this case the purchaser of the
cars (the owner of the business) maintained that his customers and not
he should be required to pay the sales tax as it was the customers who were
the ultimate consumers of the cars. The Supreme Court of Colorado refused to sustain this contention and in holding that the customers were not
subject to a sales tax on the transfers said: "We are of the opinion that the
continuous possession contemplated by .

.

. the statute is not shown in this

case." The Colorado court said, by way of dictum, "The type of transaction
the law is intended to reach is the case of the caluclating machine . . . installed at lessees business and supervised by lessor under a rental agreement
covering a continuous (and usually very considerable length of time) this
involves a more permanent type of lease that the multifarious types, renting
driverless cars for their various purposes." An Arkansas case 12 decided
under a statute13 that defined sale as "the transfer of . . . possession for a
valuable consideration, of tangible personal property regardless of the
manner. . . by which the transfer is accomplished" held that a transfer for
a limited time did not constitute a taxable sale. The court said the character of the possession referred to in the Act is "the permanent possession
...and not the temporary possession such as -we have here." Although the
cases cited above seem to indicate that the courts will consider the time
element involved in determining if the transfer of possession is a taxable
sale, there are decisions that overlook this element entirely. The New York
Supreme Court' 4 held that the transfer of motion picture films from a
distributor to an exhibitor with license to use them for a specified length
of time constituted a taxable sale. It is interesting to note that the case
was decided under a law' 5 very similar to Wyoming's in relation to its
definition of sale. It has been held that the supplying of linen goods, i.e.
towels, sheets, pillow cases, etc. to a hotel on a rental or service basis constitutes a taxable sale. 1 6 The court said in reference to time: "Possession
was transferred and the transferee asserted possessory interest in the linen
for such length of time as was necessary to carry out the purpose intend11.

Herbertson v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 274, 170 P.2d 531, 172 A.L.R. 1312 (1946).

12. Supra note 7.
13. Supra note 9.

14. United Artists Corporation v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d 254 (1937).
15. Local Law No. 20, New York City (1934).
16. Philadelphia Assn. of Linien Suppliers et. al. v. City of Philadedphia, et al., 139 Pa.
Super 560, 12 A.2d 789 (1940).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

ed."' 7 Certainly in neither of the last two cases was there ever any understanding on the part of either the transferor or the transferee that the latter
was to buy the property involved. Bearing in mind the fact that all sales
tax law is based upon statutes that have as their primary purpose the
obtaining of revenue and which contain very broad definitions of the term
sale it is not difficult to understand why many transactions will be taxed
even though the parties to the transaction had no intention to enter into
a buy and sell agreement. Many state's laws have included in their defitnitions of sale phrases that8 eliminate, to a great extent, the application of the
"time test." The statute involved in the Pennsylvania case cited 9 is typical
of such statutes. In addition to the common broad definition, "any transfer of possession" it also states "or ...license to use or consume conditionally
or otherwise."
An important factor that the courts have taken into consideration in
determining if a transfer of possession constitutes a taxable sale is whether
the article transferred represents a service rather than a sale. An Illinois
decision 20 held that the sale of blue prints, photostats and commercial
photography were not retail sales within the provisions of the Retailer
Occupation Tax Act. 2 1 The court in this case said: "We can perceive no
logical difference between the paper upon which the photostatic copy of
something is made ... and that paper which a lawyer uses for drawing a
will or a deed ... the paper is a mere incident: the skilled service is that
which is required." The Supreme Court of North Dakota2 2 held contra
in a case with very similar facts. In holding that the sale of photographs
made to order for his customers was a taxable sale as opposed to a rendition
of services, the court said: "there is no atricle fabricated by machine or
fashioned by human hand that is not the fruit of the exercise and application of individual ability and skill . .. the product resulting is tangible
personal property . . it remains the property of the maker until it is paid
for and delivered." The court decided the North Dakota case under a
statute 28 very similar to that involved in the contra Illinois case. 2 4 Some
cases 25 have held that a transaction may be in part only subject to a sales
tax. These cases hold that when "an article sold has a definite value apart
from the value, of the services rendered, . . . the value of the article may be
separated from the value of the servcies and a tax may be levied on the
sale, even though the contract may provide for one lump sum including
both the rendition of services and the sale of goods." 26 The problem con17. Ibid.
Philadelphia City Sales Tax Ordinance, Sec. 1 (d) (1938).
Supra note 16.
J. A. Burgess Co. v. Ames 359 Il.427, 194 N.E. 565 (1945).
Illinois Revised Statutes 1451, Vol. 2, C. 120, Sec. 440.
Voss v. Grey, 70 N.D. 727, 298 N.W. 1 (1941).
North Dakota Sales Tax Act.
Supra note 20.
237, 29 N.E.2d 268 (1940); Kistner v. Iowa State Board
Ahern v. Nudelman, 374 Ill.
of Assessment and Review, 225 Iowa 404, 280 N.W. 587 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Miller, 337 Pa. 246, 11 A.2d 141 (1940).
26. 139 A.L.R. 382.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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cerning a rendition of service rather than a sale is often covered by statute.
In holding that druggists receipts from sale of prescriptions were subject to
27
the sales tax, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a statute that defined
gross receipts as "total amount of sale price of retail sale, including any
28
The cases which consider the
services which were a part of those sales."
rendition of ser vices as a factor in determining whether a transfer of possession is a taxable sale seem to follow generally three views. I. That a
transfer involving essentially a rendition of services is not a taxable sale.
2. That even though an article's value consists primarily of the vendor's
service or skill the transfer is subject to a sales tax. (This is the minority
view in the absence of statute covering such transactions) 3. The courts will
take into consideration the part of the value of the article that is made up of
services as opposed to the part of the value of the article in terms of physical
worth and impose a sales tax on only the latter.
Many sales tax statutes or ordinances define a sale at retail as a transfer
of title to tangible personal property for consumption or use and not for
Cases arising in these jurisdictions force the courts to consider
resale."
as a test in determining if a transfer of possession is a taxable sale whether
or not the transferee intended to use or consume the article transferred. In
applying this test, the problem becomes one of definition; i.e. what amounts
to "use" or "consumption"? The courts have not hesitated to construe the
terms "use" and "consumption" and typical of such definitions are: "We
believe that the ordinary interpretation of the word 'use' is to assert
possessory interest in the article for some length of time,"30 is to assert
the statute... 'use' means a long continued possession and employment of a
thing for the purpose which it was adopted for as distinguished from a
possession and employment there is merely temporary or occasional" 3 1 ;
"consume or consumption does not always imply an immediate destruction
or eating up' or extermination; it may as well, and often does, contemplate
the ultimate use to which all intermediate ones lead."3 2 The California
Intermediate Court 33 used language that is typical of the cases that define
such terms as "use" and "consumption". The court said: "The word (s)
'consumed' as used in statutory provisions . . . are not technical words having a peculiar meaning in law, but are words in common use and must
be given their plain ordinary meaning." The test of consumption or use is
not necessarily confined to cases that have such a requirement set out in
the statute and the test is often applied in conjunction with other tests
including the ones referred to above.
The problem of determining what transactions constitute a taxable
sale is one that must be approached almost entirely on a local basis. The
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Wray's Pharmacy, Inc. et al. v. Lee, Comptroller, 145 Fla. 435, 199 So. 767 (1941).
Acts, 1935, C 16484, Sec. 2 (Florida).
47 Am. Jur. 229.
Howitt v. Smith and S. Publications, 276 N.Y. 345, 12 N.E.2d 435 (1938).
Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 180, 18 N.E.2d 219 (1938).
Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 42 N.M. 58, 75 P.2d 334 (1937).

33. Supra note 2.
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statutes governing such sales are far from uniform, in fact they . . . "exhibit
a surprisingly large range of variation with respect to the precise activity or
transaction taxed; the difficulties in attempting to reduce the term 'sales tax'
to any single, all inclusive formula appear to be insurmountable." 34 Adding
to the difficulty of formulating any guiding rules govering sales tax is the
fact that all sales tax law is statutory and as such is subject to the whim of
the legislators and are constantly being repealed and amended. In many
cses, whether or not a transfer is subject to sales tax will depend upon the
definition of terms in the statute. Most of the statutes have incorporated
in them their own definitions of the terms, and here again they are far
from uniform. The one thing such definitions seem to have in common is
the fact that they are far broader than the usual laymen's concept of the
term, and under the majority of the statutes the mere fact a transaction
does not have all the usual characteristics of a sale does not necessarily
mean it will not be taxable as such.
The case law on this subject is comparatively new (about 20 years)
and as time goes on it is possible the decisions of the courts on the subject
will become more uniform. The "tests" pointed out in this paper are
certainly not meant to be a conclusive solution as to what transfers of
possession are suche as to constitute a taxable sale, but they do indicate an
approach the courts have, to some extent at least, adopted.
THOMAS

J.

FAGAN

THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AN EXPRESS COVENANT

To DRILL A TEST WELL

When a Wyoming mineral owner or the owner of an oil and gas lease
desires to have a test well drilled on his land or lease he may lease or
assign, as the case may be, all or part of his interest in return for a covenant
to drill a well. Probably the most common arrangement of this type is the
"farmout" in which one party assigns a block of acreage to another party in
return for a promise to drill a well. If the assignor retains an undivided
interest in the lease he is in effect exchanging a percentage of the lease for a
test well and whatever income he will derive from his retained interest,
which ordinarily will be a carried working interest, net profit interest, oil
payment, or overriding royalty. On the other hand if the assignor assigns
all of his interest in a particular block of acreage he probably expects to
profit from the enhanced value, resulting from the drilling, of any surrounding acreage he might own. It is at once apparent that there are
various opportunities for profit in these situations and consequently when

the obligor breaches his covenant to drill it is only natural that the courts,
in an attempt to do full justice to both parties, should adopt several rem34. 47 Am. Jur. 194.

